Introduction

Nigeria is endowed with both human and natural resources. Yet, it remained undeveloped. It is a rich country with poor people, a situation of poverty in the midst of plenty.  Why have some nations developed and others not? Nations developed because nationalistic and patriotic individuals come together to transform their societies. The aim of this paper is to stress that Nigeria’s social, economic and political crises are primarily attributed to the absence of both a coalition of a developmentalist elite and a broad Developmentalist Coalition that presides over the economy and the state since the nation attained independence nearly sixty years ago. In order for Nigeria to develop and to create a shared future, in this paper, I argue for the setting up of a group/coalition of like-minded people who are driven by the ideology of development nationalism. Such a group has to be united mainly by the need to make Nigeria and its people prosper. The objective conditions in the country including insecurity, robbery and kidnapping; the rise of ethnic militias, terrorism, the menace of herdsmen, ethnic and religious conflicts; high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality; poor management of the economy and the inability of the political leadership to transform its structure; endemic corruption and state capture; mismanagement of public resources; and poor governance and dysfunctional governments are threats to the interests of the elite. Therefore, these are potent reasons for developmentalist elite to form a Developmentalist Coalition in the country. Nigeria is unlikely to survive as a nation in light of the structural injustices in the country if developmental elite, working in concert with citizens, do not come together to rescue the situation.

What is a Developmentalist Coalition?

Throughout history, the ideology of development nationalism has been a major impetus for national development, especially in late developers (such as China, Malaysia, Mauritius, South Korea and Singapore) that wants to “catch-up”. Development is therefore the material base of the ideology of nationalism. Nationalism as ideology serves as both a means of promoting development as well as to cope with development. Developmental nationalism, in this sense, refers to a commitment to making one’s country to progress and prosper, including the development of the capacities of its people to fulfill their potentials and serve as drivers of the desired development.  This ideology is promoted by patriotic and nationalistic individuals. To such individuals, the ideology of nationalism trump other considerations and identities. They love their countries and people, and hence they want their countries to succeed and their people to prosper. Those who are motivated by developmentalism are driven primarily by the need to make their country and people prosper – to overcome underdevelopment and dependence on foreign countries, as well as to improve the living standards of their people. They see underdevelopment, dependence on foreign countries and poverty as threats to not only national survival but also to their enlightened self-interest. Enhancing the productive capacity of their country is the main pre-occupation of a Developmentalist Coalition. They strive to establish inclusive economic and political institutions to actualize their goals; and do not engage in politics of self enrichment.

Reflecting on the developmental states of East Asia, Chalmers Johnson, the man who coined the term developmental state to describe the role of the State in Asian developmental success, observed that the Developmentalist Coalitions in East Asian countries were “generated and came to the fore because of the desire to break out of the stagnation of dependency and underdevelopment; the truly successful ones understand that they need the market to maintain efficiency, motivate the people over the long term, and serve as a check on institutionalised corruption while battling against underdevelopment”. Such elites and Developmental Coalition, “is not committed first and foremost to the enhancement and perpetuation of its elites privileges but to the long-term development of their societies” (Johnson (1987: 140. Emphasis added).

Developmentalist elite have a shared vision for national development – they have similiar perspectives around national development. It is cognizant of the fact that the realization of its vision is dependent on its ability to enhance the productive capacities of their economies and people. Wealth creation, thus production/value addition, rather than consumption and rent-seeking, are the major pre-occupations of a coalition of developmentalist elite, as well as a broad developmentalist coalition. Both are conscious of the fact that private gains are compatible to social objectives. Human capital development is thus one of their main priorities.

A coalition of developmentalist elite knows its onus: it ensures that overtime, the ideology of developmentalism becomes a national culture. Through words and actions, it mobilizes citizens to buy into the developmentalist agenda. More important, it ensures that its developmentalist project/agenda is anchored on a social base, hence the developmental elite identify social groups with which it forms a broad developmentalist coalition. When Developmentalist minded individuals occupy political positions, they use their positions to ensure that all segments of society makes short-term economic sacrifices for the long term shared prosperity. As a consequence, all sectors of society avoid or at least minimise rent-seeking behaviour for the sake of national development. When such a coalition assumed political power, it undertakes necessary governance and policy reforms to give expression to its vision of development for the country. This is how it creates a society in its own image! In all spheres of society, they provide leadership to ensure outcomes that are compatible to their broad vision.

The political and economic affairs of most developed nations are dominated by Developmentalist Coalitions of one form or the other. In some instances, the developmentalist elite might form their own political parties (such as the People’s Action Party formed by the first prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues) to contest for political power. In some others, individuals among them might join different political parties. However, in the context where developmentalists are the dominant political elite, whatever party is in power  – it ensures that it maintains some minimum standards that are the core principles on which the country is founded.  A good example in this regard is the Scandinavian countries where the ideology of social democracy was foisted on their societies mainly by trade unions with the support of small farmers. As a result, this ideology has taken root in Scandinavian. One outcome of this is that irrespective of the political party in power – whether of left or right political leanings – it ensures that the core elements of the principles of social democracy are not compromised. As a consequence, there is predictability in governance, including the rule of law, and the provision of basic public goods to citizens.  In the US, the Fourth Amendment (which protects against unreasonable search and seizure) and free markets are foundational and uncompromising principles irrespective of which of the two political parties, Democratic or Republican, is in power. This unity was due to external threats, that is, antagonism to King George (UK) and British mercantilism). This is not to suggest that only external threats give rise to a Developmentalist Coalition. As the Malaysian example shows, the May 1969 protests gave birth to a Developmentalist Coalition in the country to make UMNO the dominant political party for more than forty years now. Without the protests which threatened the political survival of the Bumiputra elite, they would not have bonded together as a dominant political force; and subsequently become important economic actors.  To be sure, developmentalist elite articulate values that subsequently bind and define their nations. They provide both moral and political leadership such as Nelson Mandela of South Africa. At the same time, most developmental elite tend to favour the establishment of inclusive economic and political institutions that enables them to achieve their development objectives.

Pursuant of this goal, a Developmentalist Coalition elite reaches an informal consensus on the type of society they want among themselves. Overtime, they foist the developmental ideology on citizens, which becomes a national ideology or values that is embraced by all/or most citizens irrespective of other considerations – class, gender, religion, ethnicity, and so on.

In most cases, developmentalism is driven by the need to transform the structures of the economy and to industrialise as well as build human capacity. Developmentalist Coalitions, especially those that are in control of government – in both elected and administrative positions – have used their positions, by undertaking necessary institutional and policy reforms, as well as mobilise citizens – to ensure that developmentalism becomes the hegemonic ideology in state and society. These are transformative leaders with strong desire to effect positive change in their society. To do this, however, requires, that development nationalism as an ideology is embedded in specific social groups, e.g, trade unions, entrepreneurs, professional groups, the unemployed, and so on. The specific social group with which a coalition of developmentalist elite forms an alliance is however informed by contextual conditions. The objectives remain the same: enhancement of the productive capacity and promotion of shared prosperity.

The Need for a Nigerian Developmentalist Coalition

The social, economic and political challenges facing Nigeria can largely be attributed to the absence of a Developmentalist Coalition that is highly patriotic, nationalistic and committed to the transformation of the structure of the Nigerian economy, and to overcome underdevelopment. In most of post-independent Nigeria, public affairs, especially politics and the economy, have been dominated by groups that lack a vision on how to transform the country, to industrialize it, to build common values that unite the people, to address poverty and overcome underdevelopment, as well as to overcome ethnic and religious divisions. The Nigerian crisis is that of lack of transformative leadership and the resultant weak institutions and governance failure. In fact, public affairs have been dominated largely by parasitic and consuming elite whose modus operandus is transactional. With few exceptions such as Aliko Dangote who is now engaged in the real sector, the elite lack the vision and the will to galvanise the productive capacity of the economy and society. It can safely be argued that most people that have presided over the political and economic affairs of Nigeria since independence have not been nationalistic and patriotic. Instead they have captured the Nigerian State for their selfish interests.

If they were patriotic, how else can one explain the fact that they do not invest in nation’s health and education systems (even destroyed them) and have recklessly looted our commonwealth which they store in foreign countries? Political office holders and civil servants turn billionaires overnight without owning a factory or a farm. The children of most rich Nigerians study overseas. Currently, it is unlikely that there is any Governor, Senator, Member of the House of Representatives and member of States’ Assemblies whose children are in a Nigerian university.  The poverty of the Nigerian elite is further exemplified by poor physical infrastructure in the country as well as the high level of insecurity. In fact, Nigeria has become a killing field due to terrorism, robbery, kidnapping and the killings by herdsmen. This is coupled with the fact that people die from preventive diseases and the poor state of the nation’s healthcare, which is so bad that the elite and their families have to go for treatment abroad whenever they fall sick.  Sad enough, our health institutions have become mere consulting/prescription centres ironically with beautiful fences enclosing dilapidated buildings with obsolete equipment, badly mannered or indecorous staff who are further demotivated by months of unpaid wages. It is this context that we need to understand that of the estimated 72,000 medical doctors who are registered with the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria, less than half, about 35,000 are currently practising in the country.  Of these, over 25,000 Nigerian doctors are in the United States of America.  Leadership failure is thus one of the push factors for the high level of brain drain in the country.

Some of the death in the country could have been prevented if there were good hospitals locally to get immediate treatment once they fall ill. Former Governor of Bayelsa State, Diepreye Alameiyeseigha, died few hours before planned evacuation for overseas treatment. The fate befell hundreds of Nigerians every year. To most elite, Nigeria is a cemetery where they are buried after they die in hospitals overseas. Imagine the numbers of Nigerians who have occupied leadership positions, including former Vice President Alex Ekwueme, who died in foreign hospitals in the recent past!  The situation is so bad that even President Muhammadu Buhari, spent several months in 2017 in London for medical treatment. Similiarly, former President Musa Yarardua returned to the country virtually died from Saudi Arabia where he had gone for treatment. Currently, former Petroleum Minister, Mrs Diezani Alison-Madueke, who allegedly stole millions of dollars and bought choice-properties within and outside the country, is in London on medical treatment. Had such funds been invested in the Nigerian health sector, she could have received treatment here in Nigeria and such facilities would serve other fellow Nigerians. It should be noted that because of the absence of shared values by the Nigerian elite, they do not pay their taxes, which could be used for provision of public goods.

In the absence of a dominant Coalition of Developmentalists with a shared national vision and consensus, distribution of rents has become the primary purpose of politics. In turn, rent-seeking and its associated patronages emphasize what divides rather than what unite us as a nation and people. It is in this context that we need to understand the resort to religion, ethnicity, state of origin, zoning, and the call for restructuring as defining characteristics of politics in the country.  It is therefore not surprising that successive governments had little value-addition to Nigeria’s economic, social and political development. What is clear is that there is an absence of both a coalition of developmentalist elite and a broad Developmentalist Coalition with a common national vision and consensus about Nigeria’s development and unity.  As a result, every section of Nigeria society feels marginalized. Worse still, the rent-seeking, retrogressive and consuming elite have had a field day in raping the nation of its resources – both human and natural resources.  The call for restructuring of the nation has some merits. Most of the states are not viable economically and are unable to pay salaries of civil servants and political office holders in the absence of federal allocation. Thus the argument for a return to regional governments has some merits. This notwithstanding, not much will change if there is no Developmentalist Coalition, with an enlightened self-interest, that steer the ship of governance even at regional level. Perhaps, we need look at people like the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo in terms of development outlook and Lagos State governments since 1999 to see if there are some useful lessons that we can draw respectively from attributes of a developmentalist individual (Awolowo) and how to recruit and assemble developmentalist orientated individuals to run a State which Bola Tinubu undertook in Lagos State (he appointed some progressives into his administration, some of whom were not even Lagosians). Even how President Olusegun Obasanjo assembled some of the best minds in the country in his second term might offer some useful lessons.

The absence of a coalition of developmentalist elite in Nigeria has meant that rapacious consuming elite have presided over the affairs of the state in most of our independence period. The poor management of the country by this inept group is common knowledge to every Nigerian. One outcome of the poor management of the country is poor governance. Another is dependence on crude oil: the rapacious elite do not even have the capacity to refine oil; and are unable to create incentives for generation and distribution of electricity to our people.  However, the poor management of the Nigerian economy by successive governments is not surprising because it has not been in the interest of the rent-seeking elites and tenderpreneurs – the latter depends mainly on government contracts – to manage oil resources for shared prosperity and to lay a foundation for a post-oil Nigerian economy. It is therefore not by accident that the economy is not diversified: it has a small and declining manufacturing sector! It is therefore not by accident that the economy went into recession in 2016 following the fall in global oil prices. Yes, the President Buhari administration is making efforts to diversify the economy but this remained minimal and the pace is too slow.

In the absence of a coalition of developmentalist-orientated leadership to superintend over political and administrative positions in the Nigerian state (at all levels), successive governments have not be able to manage the oil wealth and could not provide regular fuel to citizens (Nigeria is the only oil producing country where citizens experienced fuel scarcity). Similarly, they have not been able to create conditions for the diversification of the economy. Unfortunately, while this narrow production base (the formal sector) accounts for a substantial share of GDP, it has low labour absorption rate, and have very little downstream and upstream linkages to the rest of the economy. It caters for the interests of very few people while majority of Nigerians eke out a living in the non-formal and subsistence sector. The Nigerian economy is therefore an enclave economy as the formal sector (oil and gas sector) has little positive development impact on the rest of the economy. This sector has imposed the resource curse on the country.  High levels of poverty (about 70% Nigerians live on less than three hundred naira a day) and inequality, underemployment and unemployment (with youth unemployment, including university graduate unemployment among the highest in the world), and corruption are some of the by-products of the poor management of oil rents.

Furthermore, the political leadership do not invest enough on the country’s greatest assets – its people. As an example, successive administrations in the 4^th Republic have allocated to the education sector less than what UNESCO recommended that 26% of national budget be spent on the sector. Only 7% of the 2018 national budget was allocated by the President Buhari’s administration to education. Because of inadequate investment in education and lack of incentives for its young people to thrive (acquire skills and engage in startups), Nigeria is unable to take advantage of the youth bulge that could drive its development (about half of Nigeria’s population of 180 million people are less than 30 years old). In the same vein, while Nigerian youth are considerably entrepreneurial, the political leaders have not created the enabling environment for them to realise their full potentials.

The Nigerian situation is unlike other oil rich countries such as Norway. One factor that sets Norway apart from Nigeria is that in the former, there is a Developmentalist Coalition that foisted its vision of development, namely social democracy, on the Norwegian state and society. Because of this orientation, successive Norwegian governments since the discovery of oil in 1969 have ensured that they managed oil wealth to cater for the well-being of present and future generations of their people (and consequently ranked first on all major human development indicators). The Norwegian political leaders do not pillage the country’s wealth rather they save and invest massively on their people, including provision of free education and healthcare to all citizens. Norway’s Sovereign wealth fund is estimated at one trillion United States Dollars ($1 trillion). This translates to the fact that each of the five million Norwegian will receive $200000 if the savings from oil is divided among its citizens. Furthermore, the elite in Norway have used rents from oil to diversify their economy.  Therefore, the importance of both a coalition of developmentalist elite and a broad Developmentalist Coalition to a country’s development cannot be underestimated.  The coalition will essentially endear itself to the people by harping on the values that unites us rather than strengthen the ignoble course that divides us. Religion must not be given ethno geographic colouration so as to fan the embers of war instead of liberty. The coalition must strive to institutionalize achievable goals, and focus value reorientation, beginning with the elites in a manner crystal clear and transparent.

In Nigeria, the problem per say is not the absence of developmentalist oriented individuals in the country.  Such individuals can be found in all segments of the Nigerian society – in government (in elective positions and the bureaucracy), the private sector, the media, the academy, in communities, CSOs and even political parties.  The problem is the absence of a Coalition of developmentalist elite, who in turn would forge a broad Developmentalist alliance with social groups that shares its vision of development. As a consequence, they are unable to act in a collective and cohesive manner to prioritise investments in Nigeria’s greatest asset – its people.

In the absence of such a Coalition to serve as a platform for developmentalist elite to regularly interacts, shares ideas and garners support in their various professional callings, as well as to coordinate activities among themselves, developmentalists in the country have hardly make significant contribution to change the course  of Nigeria’s development. Partly because of the non-existence of an informal platform for developmentalist elite, the few developmentalists that found themselves in positions of authorities have been confronted with numerous challenges: they could not sustain institutional and policy reforms.  Similarly, in the absence of an informal platform of developmentalist-minded individuals for mutual support and reinforcement of the importance of the need to overcome national underdevelopment, some who find themselves in authorities have been consumed by the rent-seeking and pervasive corruption in the political system, while others have been frustrated and have given up.  Those who managed to bring about some positive developmental changes when in leadership positions have seen such gains reversed by their successors. The frequent policy somersault in Nigeria and the non-institutionalization of reforms are partly the consequences of the absence a Developmentalist Coalition. This trend will continue unless developmentalist elite, for their enlightened self-interest, come together to forge a common vision and to take practical steps to realize it.   The poor leadership in all sectors in the country – political, economic and social- partly reflects the absence of a Developmentalist Coalition that could foist a productivist, ethical and patriotic ethos as the defining values of Nigeria.  This sadly is a product of politics bereft of ideology, resulting in the random cross-carpeting by politicians for financial gains rather in pursuit of a tangible national goal. The ultimate outcome of this is a system of gang-raping of the commonwealth with impunity by the political class and their collaborators in the private sector. It is therefore imperative that a Developmentalist Coalition must work tirelessly to change the political landscape for Nigeria and its people to prosper.

What the Nigerian situation requires therefore is firstly, the formation of a Coalition of  Developmentalist elite and a leadership that that has clear development vision and have the political will to develop policy and plans to achieve that vision. Members of the coalition could seek political power either as individuals or as a group; and some others could engage in others forms of citizens actions to strengthen democratic governance. Secondly, a broad-based Developmentalist Coalition that includes other social groups that shares its ideology of developmentalism is required. Criteria for membership have to be determined in the course of consultations and discussions. However, among others, the coalition of developmentalist elite should comprise of few political elite, the top echelon of the bureaucracy and patriotic business elite. Also, it should include the intellingetsia, professionals, CSOs and the media.

Given the diverse ethno-religious composition of Nigeria, efforts should be made to ensure that the coalition of developmentalist elite comprise people from the various ethnic and religious groups. Members have to therefore be highly nationalistic and patriotic. One primary issue that the group has to address is articulation of its vision for Nigeria of their dream and to subsequently build consensus around that vision. Equally important is that the developmentalist project has to be anchored on specific social groups, with which the aforementioned elite will form alliances in other to create a shared future. This could be the basis to build a truly united and prosperous country, as a sure guarantee to overcoming the ethno-religious conflicts that have plagued the country.

Given the critical challenges facing the country as an economy that is dependent on oil with is associated vulnerability to external shocks; the high levels of poverty and inequality; the high levels of underemployment and unemployment; security challenges and the poor social and physical infrastructure, transforming the structure of the Nigerian economy, and consequently, enhancing its productive capacity should constitute primary objectives of the group. In addition, job creation, reducing poverty, expanding social and physical infrastructures to all Nigerians, and promotion and entrenchment of good development governance should constitute other important objectives of the group. Equally importantly is the need for such a coalition to build and promote the requisite inclusive political and economic institutions that will enable Nigeria to prosper, and for its people to fulfill their potentials.

In addition, given that the task of nation-building that was the main pre-occupation of the immediate post-colonial leaders is still uncompleted fifty eight years after independence, nation-building should constitute a central pillar of the activities of the coalition. Towards this end, the unity of the country needs to become a cardinal and uncompromising objective of the coalition. Again, part of the developmentalist ideology should be the creation of a Nigerian dream, that all Nigerians, based on merit can achieve their full potential.

In summary, the Developmentalist Coalition could be founded on the following vision, principles and agenda; as the foundational social contract  among developmentalist and between then and the Nigerian people:

• Transforming the structure of the Nigerian economy into an industrialised, post-oil economy.
  •Equitable development
• Human capital development, including women and youth empowerment
• Infrastructural development
• Anti-corruption
  •National unity and cohesion
• Democracy
• Governance based on merit
• Security
• Social justice and equal opportunities for all irrespective of religion, ethnicity and gender.

Furthermore, the platform should serve as:

• Debating and articulating a common vision for Nigeria’s development
• An informal forum for discussion of national issues
• Sharing of experiences
• Provision of mutual supports to members
• Setting and shaping national discourses and debates

Other roles that the platform can play should be determined in the course of consultations and subsequent meetings of the group.  One of the implications of this is the need for the creation of a national platform as opposed to regional, ethnic and religious platforms. This pan-Nigerian platform should cut across the existing political parties, including the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have argued for the creation of an informal, non-partisan platform of patriotic and highly nationalistic Nigerians – a Coalition of Developmentalist elite, and subsequently a broad developmentalist coalition.  This platform should primarily serve to share information about the state of the nation not propaganda or incisive rumour mongering but to forge a consensus about the type of society that developmentalists want. Through the praxis of individuals in the coalition in their everyday life – in government, business, trade unions, civil society and academia; and through engagements in national discourses, a developmentalist ethos can take root in the Nigerian state and society. This is necessary to create a shared future. Its members should be encouraged to engage in the political arena, including seeking elective positions. As such the coalition would become agent of transformational change – of a truly united Nigeria, with its productive capacity enhanced for the benefits of present and future generations. The formation of a Developmentalist Coalition is one way to end the endemic corruption in the country.  This coalition should transform democracy in the country from the ritual of elections every four years to one where political parties and their elected representatives seek to serve the Nigeria people and create a shared future. Citizens must be at the heart of democracy for it to succeed. This is why it is imperative to forge a Developmentalist Coalition. History beacons on developmentalists to provide both moral and political leadership to change the development trajectory of Nigeria.

• Omano Edigheji is Founder and CEO of Zeezi Oasis Leadership Inspiration Ltd based in Abuja. Contacts: Omanoee@gmail.com, @OmanoE

The post For Nigeria to progress and for a shared prosperity, we need a developmentalist coalition – Omano Edigheji, PhD appeared first on AfricanLiberty.

 Traveling by air from one African country to another, as those familiar with the routes and processes would testify, is often strenuous, expensive and time-wasting due to poor air connections borne out of ill-advised protectionist policies.

As Umaru Fofana, a BBC journalist, detailed in his experience in 2017 flying between the West African capitals of Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Banjul (The Gambia), a journey of 700km (400 miles) which should take about an hour could take 24 hours or 72 hours due to the non-availability of direct flights. Travelers from Freetown sometimes fly via Abidjan (Cote D’Ivoire) then Dakar (Senegal) before arriving in Banjul. A quicker but far more expensive option would be to fly to Brussels (Belgium) and then connect to Banjul.

This obviously complicated and problematic arrangement has left African countries incapacitated from exploring the full economic potentials of the budding aviation market on the continent. As a result, non-African airlines currently control about 80 percent of the air transport traffic to and from Africa, fly about 80% of intercontinental traffic to and from Africa.

The decision therefore of the African Union to launch the Single African Air Transport Market last week during the 30th AU Summit in Addis Ababa is a timely development. The Single African Air Transport Market is a flagship project of the African Union Agenda 2063, an initiative of the African Union to create a single unified air transport market in Africa, the liberalization of civil aviation in Africa and as an impetus to the continent’s economic integration agenda. SAATM will also enhance the realization of the African Passport and free movement of people and goods, as well as the creation of the continental free trade Area (CFTA).

Implementing the SAATM, which is similar to the EU’s single aviation market, would go a long way towards making African air travel more competitive by reducing protectionist policies. Liberalization of air transport within Africa to facilitate better connections within the continent would result in substantial benefits for passengers, airlines, and the economies of the respective African countries.

The 23 countries currently signed to the single air market are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe. The twenty-three countries have a combined population of roughly 670 million, more than half the population of the continent.  In addition, these 23 countries have a combined GDP of $1500 billion and their average per capita income of $2,119.5 is higher than the continent’s average of $1888. These countries also account for more than 80 percent of intra-African traffic and also accounted for over 54 percent of the 63.5 million international tourists recorded by Africa in 2015.

The aviation sector in Africa currently supports over $72 billion in GDP, creating 6.8 million jobs. Clearly, there is a lot of potential for growth there. According to the International Air Transport Association, addressing market barriers in air transport between just 12 African countries could lead to 4.9 million additional passengers journeys, unlocking $1.3 billion additional economic activity and 155,000 new jobs. The demand potential for intra-African air travel remains large and the economic benefits of policy reforms on the issue of intra-Africa connectivity could be significant. Demand for air travel to, from and within Africa is forecast to more than treble over the next 20 years – growing from 75 million passengers in 2016 to more than 240 million passengers per annum by 2035.

Under a single market, airlines from the region would be allowed to connect any two African cities, without having to go through their home hub first. South African Airways could, for example, fly Johannesburg-Nairobi-Cairo on the same trip and Ethiopian Airlines could go to Nairobi and Johannesburg in a single trip.

South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya are expected to be the biggest markets for air travel within Africa while Ethiopia will maintain its position as the key driver for air travel between Africa and the rest of the world. Currently, intra-Africa traffic accounts for at least half of the total air transport market in most African countries, with Cape Verde and Egypt being the only exceptions to this trend.

Full adherence to and implementation of the terms and agreements under the single air market policy by the various African governments is crucial but the liberalization and unification of the African air transport markets is expected to bring unprecedented financial growth for indigenous airlines in Africa, most of which currently record huge operational losses annually. This will also open the sector up for much needed foreign investment.

Bukola Ogunyemi is a policy analyst and media executive based in Lagos.

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When the Arab Spring broke out this time in 2011, bringing down the long-standing regimes in Tunisia and Egypt amongst others, many wondered whether it would be followed by an African Spring south of the Sahara.

None followed. This was in part, some concluded, because democracy had already been spreading across sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s. African citizens were increasingly taking charge of their governments, and accountability was becoming more deeply embedded.

However, this was has never been true of all African countries. While some have seen promising progress, in many others autocracy and rent-seeking, or just the ‘Big Man’, remain entrenched and as strong as ever. The question looking ahead then is: what has made the difference and will the coming year see significant change?

There are many ways to examine the latter part of that question, but elections provide one clear litmus test. Popular votes are, of course, no panacea and are just one aspect of democratic governance. But they at least provide a reality check of how countries are faring and how great the risk that they are to face an uprising or unrest.

Elections ahead

In 2018, elections are due in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. This set of countries fills the spectrum from good to bad (or no) government.

A poor country still recovering from the Ebola epidemic and recent mudslides, Sierra Leone is facing difficult circumstances.  But it does have an increasingly strong democratic culture, which is likely to be reflected in elections that, even if not technically perfect, should reflect the will of the people.

President Ernest Bai Koroma toyed with the idea of revising the Constitution to allow himself a third term. But he dropped the idea, so the country will get a new president after the 7 March vote. At the moment, it is too close to call whether the ruling APC’s Samura Kamara or an opposition candidate will emerge victorious.

In Madagascar and Mali, the outcome of elections, both scheduled for late in the year, are similarly uncertain. In Madagascar, long-standing rivalries re-surface with every election, and while President Hery Rajaonarimampianina will have some advantages of incumbency, the opposition has a solid chance of winning. In Mali, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s time in office has been turbulent, but he may well be returned given the weakness of the opposition. But there will at least be a real choice.

This is much less true of Egypt.  After not one but two revolutions since 2011 and a continuing terrorist threat, stability is a priority. But under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, this has come at a high price. Under his watch, political space has been closed drastically, thousands accused of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood have been incarcerated, and any serious potential rivals have been neutered. That means Sisi’s re-election in March is effectively a foregone conclusion. However, by stifling freedom and participation in the short-term, popular frustrations may simply be stored up for the future. Stability is far from assured.

The most interesting election this year is likely to be in Zimbabwe. The critical question here will not be whowins but how they win. Many have argued, including in African Arguments, that President Mugabe’s removal was primarily orchestrated to preserve the ZANU-PF old guard’s grip on power. But the popular jubilation at Mugabe’s departure and high expectations that things will change have put pressure on President Emmerson Mnangagwa to respond.  He has already begun to do so, promising economic reform and inviting external observers for the elections.

In the vote, the heavily-divided opposition will find it difficult to challenge ZANU-PF, even on a level playing field. But for many Zimbabweans, it is the credibility of the elections that will be key. Much of this will rest on how neutral the Electoral Commission and judiciary prove themselves to be and how the security services behave. If the vote is not considered credible, Zimbabweans will prove less patient than they were under the Old Man.

Cameroon will be another test case. After years of relative economic success and political stasis, the country is coming under stress. The government’s apparent determination to quash dissent, not only in the Anglophone south-west but in the Francophone east, bodes ill for President Paul Biya’s chances of survival, whether he wins the October elections or not. In fact, an obviously manipulated electoral victory is more likely to unleash popular anger that will prove hard to contain.

The ongoing conflict in South Sudan makes it hard to see how elections can be held at all. Even if they are, it is difficult to imagine how they will produce an outcome that would have any impact on the balance between the warring factions that currently contest the country.

The most critical elections for the stability of the region will be those in the DRC. Originally scheduled for 2016, President Joseph Kabila had them postponed to December 2017, and then to December 2018. If they still do not take place, the risk of descent into chaos will get continue to rise.

Holding elections in the DRC is never easy. The country is vast, communications poor, and the political scene fragmented. But time is running out for Kabila to hold in any way credible elections, and the people’s patience is will not last beyond the end of the year. What would follow is anyone’s guess, but a continuation of Kabila’s government is becoming increasingly less likely. For Kabila therefore, the choice is to allow elections and step down, or risk losing everything.

Nervous autocrats

Elections are insufficient in and of themselves. As Tunisia and Egypt before the Arab Spring showed, electoral democracy does not necessarily mean growth and harmony. But providing a channel for people to express their feelings and air their views can make tackling these challenges easier in the long run.

Indeed, the risk of unrest in Africa is highest in countries where elections do not reflect the popular will and where social inequality, political oppression and public unease are all mounting. Without mechanisms such as open elections to allow expression and participation, the risk of a political explosion rises every year. In some African countries, nervous autocrats increasingly resemble rich survivors from a luxury yacht, alone and adrift on a tattered raft in stormy seas. An African Spring tide could easily sweep them all away.

Culled from AfricanArguments

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Nigerians, like citizens of many large countries, often prioritise news on domestic affairs over what goes on outside their borders. However, as regional or global powers, such countries also need to be well informed about developments around the world, especially in countries where they have interests.

Nigeria accounts for 51 percent of West Africa’s population and 72 percent of its GDP. It dominates trade and investment flows within the Economic Community of West African States, and has been the main anchor for providing peace and stability in the region.

It rescued Sierra Leone from total collapse in the hands of renegade soldiers and rebels of the Revolutionary United Front before the United Nations and Britain completed the task of stabilising the country. What happens in Sierra Leone should, therefore, be important to Nigerians.

Sierra Leoneans will go to the polls on March 7 to elect new leaders. The country has made advances in democratic politics. An incumbent party was defeated in 2007 and power changed hands peacefully. There is relatively free speech and basic rights are respected, despite occasional police violence and the detention of journalists. Indeed, the country enjoys middling scores on global indices on democracy and governance.

The process leading to the March 7 poll and its aftermath needs to be properly managed to prevent a slide back to instability.

A Non-ethnic Party Challenges Historically Dominant Parties

Sierra Leone’s politics has been dominated by its two oldest parties, the All People’s Congress (APC), which has governed the country for about 35 years, and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), which led the country to independence and has held the reins of power for 16 years. Within the sub-region, it is only in Sierra Leone that the first post-independence parties have survived and thrived. Their success is linked to a decision that allowed parties to operate regardless of history, and the ability to feed on the country’s ethno-regional divide. In the 2012 elections, for instance, the APC received 80 percent of its votes from the North and Western Area, and the SLPP, 76 percent of its votes from the South and East.

The March 7 elections promise, however, to upend this duopoly. A new party, the National Grand Coalition, headed by a results-driven ex-UNIDO head and ex-chief UN advocate on sustainable energy, Kandeh Yumkella, has been advancing a new type of politics that rejects ethnic divisions.

It promises to restore lost values of merit, professionalism and relatively clean government, as well as diversifying the economy and making it work for the jobless. Large sections of the youth, the impoverished middle class, informal artisans, petty traders and ‘okada’ bike riders, those in rural communities and the vocal and active diaspora have rallied to the party’s message of change, even though the party is yet to develop structural ties with these groups.

Countries that are ethnically divided often rely on special rules, such as power sharing, electoral systems that facilitate coalition formation, and affirmative action to enhance cooperation. Nigeria, for instance, is well known for its complex rules on power sharing, the percentage of votes that candidates must have across a certain number of states to win presidential elections, and the rule of appointing a minister from each of the 36 states. The proscription of the first independence parties, which were largely regional, and application of these special rules have helped to create national parties and coalition politics.

However, in Sierra Leone, the NGC operates in an environment where the rules for managing ethnic divisions are weak. Sierra Leone operates largely a winner-takes-all system. Disturbingly, just a few days before the dissolution of parliament, the APC government even tried to lower to 50 percent, without public debate, the entrenched rule which required that a presidential run-off can only be avoided if a candidate scores 55 percent of the votes. The 55 55 percent rule is meant to encourage parties to reach beyond their ethnic strongholds.

Political scientists, scholars of diversity management, activists and policy makers should closely follow the developments unfolding in Sierra Leone. The NGC, a party that was formed barely six months ago, with no clear ethnic base or ethnicity-sensitive rules in its governance system, is challenging received orthodoxes on partisan politics in ethnically bifurcated societies. The outcome is still unclear, but the visibility the party has enjoyed in this short period is unprecedent for a new party.

What accounts for the NGC’s ability to capture the public imagination? It is down to the country’s precarious living conditions, a yearning for a new direction after 56 years of failed promises, and the NGC’s message of economic transformation, providing real jobs to unemployed or underemployed youth, radically revamping education and health provision, and contolling corruption. The party does not respect ethnic strongholds, as it attracts voters from both the APC and the SLPP. It is really liberating to witness a reordering of the political landscape as Sierra Leoneans cooperate around a party that transcends our hitherto resilient ethno-regional divisions.

Current Threats

This has created panic among the two main parties, especially the APC, which seems desperate to remain in power. Sierra Leone’s democracy faces four kinds of threats: a selective use of rules to exclude opponents in the electoral field; deepening authoritarian practices in the way the two main parties are governed; a Supreme Court ruling that has elevated the power of parties, and by implication party leaders, over the electorate in determining presidential mandates; and a worsening economic situation.

The APC is trying to limit electoral competition in order to preserve its hold on power by selectively using the constitutional rule that bars dual citizens from contesting parliamentary and presidential elections or becoming ministers. The primary target is Yumkella, who the APC thought was a dual citizen, but who renounced his American citizenship last November before he filed his nomination papers. After Yumkella outmanoeuvered the APC on his American citizenship, the party came up with two new conflicting arguments: that Yumkella did not satisfy the requirements to contest the elections because he was a dual citizen when he registered to vote, and that he did not resume his Sierra Leonean citizenship when the dual citizenship law was passed in 2006, which renders him stateless.

Legal scholars have pointed out that the 2006 dual citizenship Act allowed individuals who had lost their Sierra Leonean citizenship to resume it without conditions, and that possession of a Sierra Leonean passport is evidence of intention to resume such citizenship. They have also argued that the dual citizenship Act provides Yumkella the right to register as a voter, which is different from the requirements for contesting elections.

The irony of this attack on Yumkella’s candidacy is that, by the APC’s own admission, 53 of its 70 MPs in the dissolved parliament are from the diaspora, with many holding dual citizenship; and a large number of ministers have two citizenships. In his initial attempt to have Yumkella disqualified, the leader of the APC, Ernest Koroma, barred holders of dual citizenship, including those who have served two parliamentary terms and risked losing their pensions, from applying for his party’s parliamentary ticket. However, he still retains individuals with dual citizenship in his cabinet, which clearly violates the constitution. This issue is all about brinkmanship and targeting of opponents – not respect for rules.

The second threat to Sierra Leone’s democracy is the deepening of authoritarian practices in the two main parties. In a previous article, I traced the roots of this authoritarianism to the delegate system used by the two parties to choose leaders, and the supreme power enjoyed by the ruling party’s leader. Party leaders dictate the composition of the electoral colleges, and the small size of the electoral colleges facilitates bribery and the coercion of voters. Indeed, the APC has not even held a competitive election for a national position since 2007. Koroma also enjoys the title of Life Chairman of the party, which is a throwback to the bad governance days of ‘life presidents’ that ruined African countries in the 1970s. He was allowed to select the party’s presidential candidate and running mate, even though more than 1,000 delegates had assembled at a delegate conference to do just that. Julius Maada Bio, the SLPP’s presidential candidate, who is referred to as Paopa (i.e. ‘he will rule, whether the public likes it or not’), also enjoys total control of his party after protracted conflicts, sometimes violent, over delegate lists, formation of parallel executive committees, and court battles. He also carries a historical baggage of coup making, allegations of involvment in corruption when he was a military leader for three months, and a US travel visa rejection.

A ruling by the Supreme Court in 2015 that the loss of party membership should lead to the removal of a sitting president or vice president is the third threat to our fledgling democracy. Even though Koroma and his vice president were elected on a joint ticket, he took the unprecedented decision to sack him in the middle of the Ebola crisis in 2015. What the Supreme Court’s ruling suggests is that as supreme leader of the APC, Koroma can cause the removal of his handpicked presidential candidate from the party if the latter wins, which will lead to his loss of the presidency. An ECOWAS Court later ruled that the vice president’s removal from the party was unlawful as it failed to follow due process. This is the most serious threat of a constitutional nature Sierra Leone faces as a nation. Efforts by the Constitutional Review Committee to correct this problem were rejected by the government.

Sierra Leone’s economy has also been in dire straits since 2015 as GDP contrated sharply by 21 percent that year largely due to the collapse of global iron prices and the Ebola pandemic that halted many activities. Despite a moderate recovery in 2016 and 2017, the economy remains undiversified; about 80 percent of the youth are in poverty and 60 percent are not productively employed; inflation is about 20 percent, with the price of rice, the staple food, having risen by about 60 percent between 2015 and 2017; salaries of teachers and civil servants are not being paid on time; and corruption has corroded public and religious values—with missing Ebola funds and pilfering of pilgrims’ payments for the 2017 Hajj by State House officials the most scandalous.

Only a small group with links to government and mining companies benefited from the mining boom of 2012-13 through kickbacks that allowed companies to enjoy zero taxes and duty waivers on imported goods. The IMF has suspended funding of the government’s budget after it reneged on an agreement to boost revenue flows through the ending of duty waivers and lifting subsidies on rice and fuel. To placate voters, the government is pursuing a populist budget involving a variety of vote-catching expenditures for which it has not been able to raise the necessary funds. The situation is likely to get more desperate for many families in the coming months, which in an election period can be destabilising.

Conclusion

Sierra Leone is at a crossroads again in these elections. The politics of brinkmanship, authoritarian impulses, and a mismanaged economy that blighted the future of young people were the drivers for our civil war. Bad governance under the APC, which was in power from 1968 to 1992, was largely responsible for that catastrophe. Will the elections be free, fair and credible? Will losers – government and opposition parties – accept defeat if the results are certified as credible? And will Koroma usher in a peaceful transfer of power if his party loses, as Ahmad Tejan-Kabbah did in 2007? Nigerians and the global public need to be fully engaged in observing the process. Sierra Leoneans do not want another bailout.

Yusuf Bangura writes from Nyon, Switzerland, and can be reached through Bangura.ym@gmail.com.

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George Ogola, University of Central Lancashire

In a move that has exposed Kenya’s fragile democracy, the government recently shut down the country’s three biggest TV stations.

This unprecedented, unlawful and panicked response was supposed to ensure that there was no live coverage of the mock swearing in of the National Super Alliance (NASA) opposition leader Raila Odinga as the ‘People’s President’.

The government outlawed the January 30 event and threatened to charge Odinga with treason.

NASA has refused to recognise Uhuru Kenyatta as Kenya’s legitimate president even though he won the repeat presidential election last October. The repeat election was held after the Supreme Court annulled the first poll in August. NASA insists it won the August election and boycotted the repeat poll.

The media shutdown has been widely condemned by rights groups, politicians, and the public. It has also been condemned by the US, the European Union and the United Nations.

Not since former President Daniel Arap Moi’s tyrannical rule in the 1980s through the 1990s has a government been so brazen in its disregard for the rule of law and as antagonistic to a free press. In fact, recent events are the culmination of a sustained vindictive campaign by Kenyatta against the media in Kenya.

Evolution of repression

In the 1980s Moi’s government routinely jailed journalists and banned publications. With his exit from power this despotic streak abated. But media repression took new forms.

The government began to exert influence through selective advertising, suspect allocation of broadcast frequencies and the co-option of media owners and journalists.

Instances of raw intimidation were extremely rare. One such isolated incident occurred in 2005 when former President Mwai Kibaki’s wife stormed a media house, slapped a TV cameraman, and confiscated note books and tape recorders. She was protesting the perceived negative coverage of the first family.

Kenya boasts a relatively robust media with over 60 TV stations, more than 130 radio stations and several newspaper titles. But, the industry is dominated by three big players; namely the Nation Media Group, Standard Group and Royal Media Services. Successive governments have thus courted the support of these three groups which own NTV, KTN and Citizen, respectively – the three TV stations that were recently shut down by Kenyatta.

Rolling back the gains

Kenyatta’s clampdown on the media in Kenya was not entirely unexpected. Since first becoming president in 2013, his consolidation of political power has been ruthless. He has established a political system in which there is no clear distinction between the Jubilee Party and the state.

The police have been militarised, and alternative centres of political power both within the government and in the opposition are being dismantled.

Like his father Jomo in the 1970s and Moi in the 1980s, Kenyatta is slowly embodying the image of a dictator through a combination of co-opting Kenya’s wealthy economic and political class, and brute force.

Having won the 2013 elections in a controversial victory made possible through the support of a number of smaller political parties, Kenyatta later insisted on their dissolution and the formation of one umbrella party – Jubilee. He then became party leader.

Where he previously had to navigate the interests of various parties to implement his agenda, he can now make unilateral decisions with minimum opposition.

Kenyatta’s media strategy

To further consolidate his power Kenyatta has invested massively in Mediamax, his family’s media company which owns several radio stations, a television station and a national newspaper.

He has also attempted to co-opt sections of the mainstream media. Soon after his inauguration in 2013, he invited some of the country’s top editors and journalists to State House for a “breakfast meeting”. This, he said, was to open a new chapter in “press-state” relations.

The much criticised invitation was quickly repaid with sympathetic and sycophantic media coverage of the government. And, a few high-level journalists wereoffered plum state jobs.

But, some sections of the press refused to play ball, and the public turned against what was gradually becoming a pliant media. Soon after that the honeymoon ended and the media clampdown began in earnest. Just one year after becoming president, editors and media managers started getting routine summons to State House.

Kenyatta even had the gumption to warn journalists on World Freedom Day in 2014 that they did not have absolute freedom on what to publish or broadcast. Since then the clampdown has been relentless.

Last April, the government decided to stop advertising in local commercial media. State departments and agencies were directed to advertise in the government newspaper and online portal My.Gov.

While it claimed this was to curb runaway spending it was clear the decision was aimed at starving the mainstream media of advertising revenue. This move came not long after Denis Galava, a top Kenyan journalist and editor at the Nation Media Group, was sacked for writing a scathing editorial about the President.

More recently the deputy president’s spokesperson threatened a journalist with sacking following a news report that claimed the president and his deputy had disagreed over cabinet appointments.

Meanwhile, just days before Odinga’s “swearing in”, Linus Kaikai, chairman of the Kenya Editors Guild, claimed that a number of editors and media managers were summoned to State House and given a dressing down by the president, threatening to revoke the licences of those who broadcast the event live.

Kaikai and fellow Nation journalists Larry Madowo and Ken Mujungu have since been threatened with arrest. They had to go to court to obtain anticipatory bail to bar police from arresting them.

Free press vital

There are ominous signs that Kenyatta is on a mission to silence the press as he consolidates his power. The government’s decision to disobey the court order directing it to end the media shutdown shows disdain for the law, and press freedom.

Although the mainstream media hasn’t done itself any favours by cosying up to him, it has largely played a vital role in sustaining political accountability.

With both houses of Parliament dominated by the ruling Jubilee Party, a weakened civil society, and opposition leaders without the institutional capacity to meaningfully confront the government, Kenya’s mainstream media remains a bulwark against the country’s descent to authoritarianism.

Kenya’s mainstream media must thus reclaim its place and defend the many liberties currently at stake under Kenyatta’s government.

George Ogola, Reader in Journalism, University of Central Lancashire

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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There is room for the exchange of ideas between South Africa and Nigeria; this according to Akin Oyebode, Executive Secretary of the Lagos State Employment Trust Fund. CNBC Africa caught up with him at a Business Round table in Lagos. Read more here.

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In South Africa, automotive industry accounts for about 7 per cent of GDP, with BMW, VW and Nissan putting money into the country. But, some said, the government’s plans may be over-ambitious.

SOUTH Africa is proposing to car makers, including Toyota, Ford and BMW, more than double production in return for tax breaks so the companies can ship the cars to Europe.

The automotive industry is one of the sources for GDP and has been one of the few highlights of a period of sluggish economic growth, according to the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers.

This can be put down to a state-incentive programme that expires at the end of 2020, which both the car manufacturers and the Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies, are keen to extend for another 15 years.

At stake is a potential reversal of a steady flow of new investment by car makers. BMW has spent more than Rands 6 billion on a plant in Rosslyn, north of Pretoria, and last month started production of the X3 SUV at the site – the first time it’s been made outside the US.

Volkswagen (VW) and Nissan announced major expansion plans in 2015, while China’s Beijing Automotive International Corporation (BAIC) is constructing Rands 11 billion facility in Port Elizabeth.

With talks underway, the two parties are at odds on a number of issues — especially the state’s targets for what it wants the industry to achieve by 2035, according to NAAMSA Director, Nico Vermeulen.

A production increase over that period to one per cent of global output, or as many as 1.5 million vehicles a year, is over-ambitious, he said.

South Africa produced about 600,000 units in 2017, the majority for export, and NAAMSA forecasts an increase to 850,000 in 2020.

A second point of contention in the negotiations is a government demand for the vehicle makers to double the size of their combined workforce to about 225,000. This is unrealistic given the global industry’s shift toward robotics and automation, Vermeulen said.

The manufacturers are committed to increasing production and employment if the incentives are adequate, he said, but are reluctant to agree to specific targets.

Speaking in Port Elizabeth, where Volkswagen is the biggest employer, Davies said he’s “more or less at the point where we will take a decision as to what the government programme will be”.

There will be some changes to the present programme, such as deepening the incentives related to component manufacturing, though it will build on the present framework, he said.

Losing car makers would deliver an economic blow to South Africa, which must be careful to avoid a scenario similar to what’s unfolded in Australia, according to BMW’s Chief Executive Officer, Tim Abbott.

General Motors (GM), Ford and Toyota have all closed plants in Australia over the past two years, leading to hundreds of job losses. This was mainly due to a strengthening currency and competition from lower-cost labour markets.

For the automotive industry’s role in the economy to be sustained, an upgrade to the existing Automotive Production and Development Programme (APDP) must be seen by the car makers as a continuation of existing policy, according to Sam Rolland, an economist at Econometrix in Johannesburg.

Rolland said: “It’s likely that the replacement to the APDP will contain many elements similar to the current policy.”

He added: “This is to guarantee that car makers investing in the country are able to adequately plan production lines, production inputs and workforce requirements.”

Source: Business Live

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Ethiopia’s state-run telecoms monopoly has agreed to allow some local firms provide Internet services through its infrastructure – a move seen as spurring competition and expanding the data market, officials said.

Ethio Telecom has more than 16 million subscribers of Internet services in the country of over 100 million people.

It generated over $1 billion in revenues in the first nine months of 2017/18, 70 per cent of which was earned from mobile services and 18 per cent from Internet.

“Our objective of signing Virtual Internet Service Provider (VISP) agreements is to increase subscriptions,” said Abdurahim Ahmed, the company’s head of communications.

“There may be price reductions. There will be competition among themselves, that is the core idea,” he told Reuters.

Abdurahim said eight firms have so far signed up to provide the services, which include different Internet packages. Foreign companies were not allowed to provide services, he said.

Ethiopia is one of few African countries to still have a state monopoly in telecoms. The companies that signed agreements with Ethio Telecom have either been established to sign up for this new business or they were previously doing other business.

The government has ruled out liberalising the telecoms sector, saying the revenue it generates was being spent on infrastructure projects, such as railways.

While Ethio Telecom has consistently increased annual revenue, vast parts of the country, including the capital, still suffer from occasionally patchy mobile reception and Internet services.

The low Internet penetration and poor quality of service in Ethiopia is often a drag on businesses and is especially seen as an obstacle to technology start-ups such as those that have thrived in neighbouring Kenya.

Source: Reuters

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James Scott, Chief Digital Officer of Absa Corporate and Investment Bank, writes on how digital revolution is fast-tracking growth on African continent.
IF there was ever a time to watch progress in Africa, it would be now. As we have seen so many times before, the continent has the ability to leapfrog technological trends and with the rapid scaling of digital technologies we believe there are huge opportunities awaiting to be exploited. The explosion of digital continues to gain momentum and digital, data, design and the emergence of the Fintech sector are all fast becoming the driving force behind this.

All organizations across segments and sectors need to evaluate their strategies and their response to these trends. As a result, new business models are emerging, partnerships forming, innovation is scaling and the time is now to harness these trends to create more opportunities. Africa is in a unique position to take advantage of the digital trends that are emerging at present. As a continent, it remains the leader in mobile money with over $22 billion moved annually and that trend is likely to continue. With the underlying improvements in technological capabilities, connectivity and the proliferation of mobile devices he anticipates exciting times ahead for the digital transformation of the continent.

The growing use of big data, mobile, cloud computing and artificial intelligence gives organisations the ability to re-imagine client experiences, deliver products & services instantly to large numbers of clients at a lower cost. The other big trends that cannot be ignored are blockchain technology as well as the much talked about cryptocurrencies. These shift the way we think about international payments, trade finance, identity as well as the future of money itself. Over time Blockchain will bring transparency, cost reduction and efficiencies that organizations haven’t been able to offer before.
Thriving Fintech Ecosystem

But it’s not just emerging technologies that are changing the way Africa does business. The significantly lower barriers to entry technology has provided small businesses, has seen a thriving FinTech ecosystem emerge. In 2016 there was a 33% growth in investments into start-ups, that saw $367m flow into the sector. While there is a concentration of the Fintech’s around South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria this trend actually continues across the continent. Fintech companies on the continent are looking to go after African problems and opportunities, and many of these companies look into payments, remittances, identity, financial inclusion and leveraging data to improve credit scoring and access to basic financial products. These companies not only offer job creation, new revenue opportunities and cheaper methods of delivery but also improve financial inclusion. As of 2014 over 60% of the adults in Sub-Saharan Africa didn’t have bank accounts so by embracing the FinTech revolution, we will significantly improve basic access to financial services.

Partnerships and evolving business models

The World Economic Forum believes that partnerships with Fintech’s is one of the biggest business trends to watch this year, particularly in the technology space. It was initially feared that FinTech’s would disrupt the big players in the various fields however these previous ‘enemies’ are coming together to use one another’s strengths for mutual benefit.

Through these partnerships and start-ups, business models are starting to evolve and move into new and sometimes unexpected places. From this new digital perspective, the payments landscape is changing and becoming more competitive as young companies look to reduce the cost of transacting as well as bringing speed and agility to companies operating in the African corridor.

According to the 2017 PwC Global FinTech Report, 82% of the Financial Institutions interviewed expect to increase their FinTech partnerships in the next three to five years. This will most probably be met with quite a bit of internal resistance as bigger organisations grapple with the new ways of working required to partner effectively with more agile and quick acting start-ups. However, the key to making this a success is to choose the right people to partner with.

We cannot ignore the digital growth on the continent – as it opens up a wealth of opportunities to bring banking to the previously unbanked. With financial inclusion high on our list of priorities for Africa, we are excited about accelerating our digital growth in Africa.

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As recently as March 2018, the discussion of neither political reforms nor economic liberalization was inconceivable in the Ethiopian political context. The changes both may have been an internal party decision, particularly after the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF’s) 17-day dramatic deep renewal closed door meeting in December 2017. However, there is no denying that the emergence of a reformist, young and ambitious Prime Minster, Abiy Ahmed, has not just sparked unprecedented hopes and opened possibilities in the country, but also put these changes on autopilot. PM Abiy took over from Hailemariam Desalegn as Ethiopia’s new prime minister after the latter’s unexpected resignation in February 2018.

Abiy Ahmed’s election, as a leader of the ruling party, did not occur uncontested within the party. In spite of the internal party fall out, however, the peaceful transition of power was a significant leap for the country with precarious past that nurtured division and animosity among its various ethnic groups for almost three decades.

The new prime minister has made many promises and delivered on some within his first hundred days in office. Nonetheless, there are still high expectations from the general public on his commitments including to pave a way for transition to democracy and genuine multi-party system in Ethiopia. In hopes of fulfilling these efforts, the people of Ethiopia from all walks of life, including opposition parties, have overwhelmingly support the new PM’s visions for the country and want him to succeed. Notably, he inherited a country that has seen some of the fastest economic growth in the world in recent years, but has also been riven by years of protests by the young and old alike, in Oromia, Amhara and several cities and towns in southern regional states; Ethiopians who live marginalized politically and economically.

The issues facing the country are countless. For starter, the PM has a daunting task ahead of him of uniting a country that has been fragmented by years of protests, violation of human rights, economic disparity and corruption. The second, perhaps, the most challenging task, is that of reinventing the wheel of balanced economic development that boosts the full participation of citizens reinforced by good governance and administrative efficiencies. In all cases, he will be faced with immense resistance from people who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

In an effort to spur economic growth, the PM has floated his intention to privatize some of state owned institution in full or in part. There have been discussions as to how the country could set the stage for domestic and international investors to inject the much needed fund and foreign currency into the economy. This shift in direction is remarkable given the fact that controlling the market, presumably, has been the core principle of the elites within his party and the decision many not have been reached without sharp division within the party.

First, it is important to understand why countries take the path of privatization. There are three main reasons that pressure countries to privatize – budgetary stress, the desire to foster competition, and/or a push from international ‘donors’. In his June 19th, 2018 speech to the general public and business communities, the PM has stressed that the country is in dire need of foreign currency and he would do anything to create economic stability.

This concession in public, by the Prime Minister, was seen as brave since there were no other previous leaders who have acknowledged government’s near totally failure. It is not a secret that the country has a high budget deficit, high foreign debt, and is dependent on international agencies like the World Bank (WB)and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its annual budget planning. This suggests that the country is more likely to pursue privatization as a source of revenue. It seems rewarding as this would give it a breathing room in the short term considering the country’s immediate need.

It is generally understood that privatizing inefficient state run organizations would enable governments to raise funds that would be invested in social programs such as education and healthcare. However, the policy remains controversial and the relative roles of ownership and other structural changes in promoting economic efficiency remain uncertain. Some believe that what belongs to the public should remain with the public, while others argue that private enterprises are better situated to be run by private businesses, not government which has failed to run its mega companies in the first place. These companies, the argument goes, have (if run by private businesses) a potential to generate the revenue that is needed to support the ambitious economic growth and other social services.

The evidence from other developing countries indicates that if privatization is to be effective over the longer term, it needs to be accompanied by policy instruments that stimulate competition and effective policy directives which need to be integrated into a broader process of structural reform. Privatization without a tested policy and legal framework, mature political and economic infrastructures, and a capacity to negotiate with multinationals would prove anything but efficient. A poorly designed privatization would, in the long-run, lead the country in the path of irreversible post-privatization predicament where monopolies and international corporations assert the economic upper hand.

It is appealing for governments to privatize first and seek competition later as the expected revenue is higher than it would be in the case of adopting competition first and then privatizing. When a government entity is transferred to private ownership, the price the government receives reflects the future expected profits of the business by the private owners. If the government privatizes the business with minimal or no competition (monopoly), then the probable profits and price received by the government is high (high social cost). However, if the government sets up a competitive market beforehand, then the future expected profits from privatization is likely going to be lower and so is the payment received by the government (low social cost). Privatization doesn’t just increase costs. It also leads to greater inequality, as user fees increase and operators reduce wages (even layoffs) and benefits for workers.

For any type of public company, shifting the provision of ownership to the private sector is not a simple solution that fits all. According to Bank of Canada, government policy in the areas of privatization in Canada has generally been less rapid and extensive than other developed countries with comparable economy. For instance, in Canada, nationalized industries are deemed to be natural monopolies, such as the generation and distribution of electricity, or industries considered vital to the development of provincial and federal economies.

To date, majority of Canadian utilities are owned by Federal government, Provincial governments or local Municipalities. However, due to fiscal constraints, increased concern about the efficiency of public ownership, changing conceptions of natural monopolies, and the availability of other options to meet public policy objectives, governments in Canada began to privatize their corporate holdings in the mid-1980s. Given the size of the Canadian economy, political stability and abundant natural resources, the slow process can be a successful model for any country evaluating privatization.

The other aspect of such major undertaking is the national security concerns in certain industry. Especially, major corporations like Telecommunications and Electric Power are considered in the interest of a national security to remain under public holdings. These types of corporations are mostly maintained in full or in part under state or local government authorities. The concept of privatization has been controversial and among top debates in any political settings, even in the countries that have enjoyed the benefits of liberal market for many years.

Before embarking on the idea of transferring government owned enterprises, the following steps would help mitigate the risk of running in to complex post-privatization challenges.

As initial step, the government would need to liberalize the market (laissez faire) by eliminating state control over economic activities. This includes the pursuit of lower tax rates for businesses, less restriction on both domestic and foreign capital, less strict market regulations, eliminating privileges, removing unjustified tariffs, and subsidies. Such an approach would encourage, at least to some degree, home-grown businesses to flourish and be innovative.

Establish an advisory council, with a clear mandate, that conducts case-by-case or sectoral studies to identify sectors that are inefficient and need to be privatized. This would include designing a phased approach as mass privatization is likely to lead to massive self-dealing.

Study the possibility of introducing a hybrid privatization approach where there exists government and private ownership cooperation. This could be outsourcing the management part of the organization and maintaining the core business.

Set out parameters as to how foreign ownership can play a role in Ethiopian infrastructures – set a threshold for foreign takeovers and empower and provide tax incentives to local investors to participate and invest heavily in public infrastructures.

Set out robust rules for privatized businesses and create institutions with the authority to implement privatization and build their capacity to monitor compliance with these rules. This would include establishing a competition bureau in order to prevent the potential cartel effects of purchase of state enterprises by domestic or foreign entities with market power.

Although state-owned companies do tend to be less efficient in resource allocation due, mainly, to corrupt individuals, private businesses are also – by design – more likely to focus on profit regardless of broader societal costs. In theory, privatization approaches are based on the premise that the private sector can deliver goods and services more effectively and efficiently than the public sector. However, various studies have shown that neither private nor state-led institutions are perfect by themselves. As such, governments can play a central role in developing various policies that would contribute to a functional market-driven economic development.

• The authors:

Kefyalew Gemeda holds a Master’s degree in Economics from Carlton University.

Hussien Berisso holds a Master’s and Bachelor’s degree in Engineering from Ryerson University.

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Following widespread criticism and outcry that trailed imposition of tax on social media usage in the Republic of Benin, the West African country has shown respect to the views of its citizens who fought against the social media and Internet tax law initiated last month.

The government introduced the law to tax its citizens 5 CFA francs ($0.008) per megabyte on the usage of social media apps, and another 5 per cent levy on texting and Internet calls. Civil society organisations described the decision as a move to silence critics.

Over 7,000 Beninese signed a petition calling for the suspension of the levy, which, they said, would not favour the country of a population of 10 million people with a minimum wage of about 40,000 CFA francs ($70.56).

Thousands of young Beninese used hashtags to protest against the tax.

President Patrice Talon, in a tweet, announced the repeal of the law on social media and Internet tax, saying the decision was reached “following a meeting the government ministers had with telecommunication companies”.

Digital rights advocates, Internet Sans Frontières (Internet Without Borders), attributed the “victory” to the activism and strength of the thousands of young Beninese citizens who engaged the government and enforced democracy in their country.

“Internet Without Borders welcomes this victory of digital citizenship in Benin. The mobilization online, around the Hashtag #TaxePamesMo (Don’t Tax My MegaBytes), showed to the world the anger of netizens in the country. This anger and indignation enabled them to denounce the tax and to enter into a dialogue with the authorities, which fortunately led to its cancellation. This case also shows the strength of the young Beninese democracy. The annulment of the social media tax is an important precedent for digital rights and freedoms in West Africa,” says Julie Owono, the Executive Director of Internet Without Borders.

This decision makes Benin the first African country to repeal a law on the internet tax after it joined the likes of Zambia and Uganda to impose taxes on internet usage despite a heavy backlash.

Kenya recently announced plans to impose taxes on the internet as part of the amendments of the country’s Finance Act which proposes a 15 per cent tax on internet services.

The amendment also includes an increased tax on telephone services and all money transfer services from the previous 10 per cent to 20 per cent. The tax will affect money transfer via mobile, banks, agencies and other financial service providers.

In Zambia, the government collects the taxes through mobile phone companies and internet service providers at a daily rate of 30 Ngwees (3 cents) per day, irrespective of how many Internet calls are made.

The whole Internet tax craze started in Uganda where the government ignored protests and imposed a mandatory 200 shilling daily levy (less than a dollar) for WhatsApp users while mobile money transactions also attracted a one per cent levy on the total value of each transaction.

In a bid to control what he called gossip and to rake in more revenue to the state, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni announced the taxes in April and it was approved by the parliament in May.

It is expected to raise between $108,000,000 (Sh 400 billion) and $270,000,000 (Sh 1.4 trillion) from social media users annually, the government said.

Ugandans have expressed disgust at the development, saying it infringes on individual freedoms.

Others are also wondering how social media companies that do business in Uganda will be taxed since internet access is not based solely on the activation of data bundles through the purchase of airtime from telecoms.

For some lawmakers, instead of taxing social media, the president must pay attention to the fight against corruption in government.

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A few days ago, The Initiative for Equal Rights (TIERS), a Nigeria-based non-profit organisation working to protect and promote the human rights of sexual minorities nationally and regionally” posted a video clip on Youtube as part of its #UntoldFacts discussion series. The aim of the video and the conversations around it stem from the tendency for human rights activists in the country to be selective with respect to the types of rights that they promote. Azeenarh Mohammed, TIERs’ Executive Director, in the video called human rights activists to stand up for all people and stop being “selective rights activists”.  

The video hit a nerve. I occasionally identify as a human rights activist depending on the situation and the audience. My entire professional career has been dedicated to not only standing up for and bringing to bear, the issues of all human and economic freedoms but also raising a generation of young people dedicated to defending these freedoms in their communities. Azeenarh makes a very valid point. Many human rights activists in Nigeria are selective with respect to the issues that they defend publicly. Most of them will, however, agree in private that it is important to defend the rights of sexual minorities. I have stood in those shoes before, but not anymore. At the founding of African Students For Liberty (ASFL) in 2013, we made a conscious but uncomfortable decision to withhold on full-scale advocacy for the rights of sexual minorities till we were strong enough to withstand the expected backlash.

ASFL was founded in Nigeria at the time when the debate around the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act 2013 heated up the polity. The law criminalizes same-sex marriage with a 14-year jail term for offenders. Under this law, membership or support of gay organizations, associations or clubs carries a penalty of up to 10 years in prison. This law prohibits homosexuals from even meeting in groups of two or more, bans marriage or civil unions between people of the same sex and criminalises gay clubs and events.

According to an NOI Polls survey conducted in June 2013, 92% of Nigerians support the legislation, making Nigeria the second-highest rate of non-acceptance of homosexuality out of 45 countries surveyed. The decision to temporarily hold off on pro-LGBT rights advocacy and focus on promoting other human and economic freedoms was a decision made to survive the times.  With a tremendous growth since founding, ASFL now boasts of presence in 24 African countries and now has the courage to stand for all freedoms, strong enough to push the taboo boundaries and stand in the face of bigotry of any kind.

At our annual conference for West African students that has held in Ibadan, Nigeria since 2013,  speakers on the rights of sexual minorities have found the gathering and the ASFL community, a comfortable space for LGBT discussions.  At the 2017 conference, Olumide Makanjuola, who at the time, was head of TIERs,  publicly identified, and made his first appearance as a gay man. These conferences always have quite a number of closeted participants in the audience.

At the 2018 Regional Conference, Pamela Adie, who heads the Equality Hub,a nonprofit organization working to advance the rights and well-being of female sexual minorities in Nigeria, spoke on the need to create a society where sexual orientation would not be a parameter to judge people, but their character. She recounted how she came out of the closet as a lesbian, and called for an end to discrimination against people with unconventional sexual orientation, saying everyone matters in achieving gender balance in Nigeria. In a couple of tweets after the conference, she narrated how some LGBT persons identified and related to her story at the event. (Find Screenshots below)

ASFL conferences have thus become open spaces for everybody including sexual minorities to feel welcomed. The recent NOI poll reveals an interesting trend, that the fight against bigotry is one that will be won eventually. The NOI conducted a poll in 2017 against the 2015 poll, to compare attitudes towards sexual minorities in Nigeria. The poll showed a seven per cent increase in acceptance of sexual minorities and nine per cent rise to thirty-nine per cent of those surveyed, who think that sexual minorities should be allowed equal access to public services such as healthcare, education and housing. The rights of everyone matter, the journey is a long one but we will continue in the de-promotion of hate and we will achieve an inclusive Nigeria, surely.  

Olumayowa Okediran is the Managing Director of African Liberty and Assistant Director of International Programs at Students For Liberty

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